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Abstract
We develop a framework that puts the administration at the core of the re-
lationship between trade and political liberties. A ruler chooses the size of an
administration that (i) collects taxes and (ii) provides law and order for a repre-
sentative merchant to use. To be exploited, large gains from trade require a rel-
atively large administration. However, keeping a large administration in check is
difficult. When the resulting inefficiencies are significant, the ruler grants control
of the administration to the better-informed merchant, even though this facilitates
tax evasion. We analyze the case of post-Norman Conquest England (1066-1307)
by using evidence on taxation, commerce, and political liberties across boroughs.
We use boroughs’ ownership as a proxy for the cost of controlling the adminis-
tration, and find that rulers with a high cost are more willing to grant boroughs
the control of their administration. Also, provided it belongs to a high-cost ruler,
a borough’s propensity to receive a grant increases with its commercial impor-
tance. Finally, we find that boroughs are willing to pay higher taxes in exchange
for liberties.
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Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment, were more ter-
rible than thieves and plunderers, and more savage than the most savage.
Henry of Huntingdon (ca. 1088-1154), in Bisson (2009), p. 178.
1 Introduction
In the eleventh century, much of western Europe was organized as a feudal society.
Trade was scant and the majority of the population enjoyed limited liberties. Over
the next two centuries, trade flourished and, in parallel, merchant towns developed
significant political liberties (Lopez (1976), North and Thomas (1973)). England is
a case in point.1 During the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, urban
settlements more than doubled, thousands of markets were created,2 and many towns
obtained the right to appoint and fire the officials in charge of their administration.
We propose a theory that puts the local administration at the core of the relation-
ship between trade and political liberties, and apply it to the case of post-Norman
Conquest England (1066-1307). Starting in the twelfth century, English feudal rulers
– for example, king and barons – expanded the local administration needed to pro-
tect trade routes, administer markets, enforce contracts, and tax the growing volume
of trade. Along with this expansion, the population voiced complaints regarding the
behavior of local officials (sheriffs, bailiffs, etc.). The people accused officials of engag-
ing in widespread expropriation. These grievances forced the king to launch inquiries
into their conduct and adopt costly administrative measures. Citizens increasingly ex-
pressed the desire to handle the local administration themselves. Despite the inevitable
1Several factors point to an environment increasingly favorable to trade starting in the tenth
century, including population growth (North and Thomas (1973)), regained access to Mediterranean
trade, and, in England, a stable society following the Norman Conquest. Also, significant technological
progress wass under way in English agriculture, such as horse traction for hauling and windmills
(Langdon and Masschaele (2006)).
2Only 139 markets are recorded for 1086 (Britnell (1981)).
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loss of control over citizens, the king and, to a lesser extent, local lords eventually gave
in to their desires by granting towns Charters of Liberties.
We develop a model based on the following observations. First, the higher the
potential gains from trade, the greater the demand for law and order. Second, the
local administration that supplies law and order is capable of coercion and, therefore,
capable of expropriation.3 Third, citizens – because of their superior information – are
better able than distant rulers to monitor the behavior of the local administration.4 We
argue that when (i) a relatively large administration is necessary to reap the benefits
from trade and (ii) its monitoring is difficult for the ruler, granting citizens the right
to elect local officials is mutually beneficial and leads to a more efficient supply of law
and order.5
In our model, a revenue-maximizing ruler chooses the size of the administration
required to (i) provide law and order for a representative merchant and (ii) collect
taxes. Their interaction is repeated and leads to an agreed-upon level of taxation. The
cost of controlling the administration is especially high when its size is so large that it
can expropriate the merchant against the ruler’s wishes.6 To reduce this cost, the ruler
can downsize the administration. In a rural economy, where demand for law and order is
low, controlling the administration through its size involves no production inefficiencies.
3On the issues of state building and coercion, see Lane (1958) and, more recently, Mayshar, Moav
and Neeman (2015). Besley and Persson (2009) and Besley and Robinson (2010) analyze the link
between coercion and the provision of law and order. See also Olson (1993) and Grossman and Kim
(1995).
4Bardhan (2002). See Banerjee, Hanna and Mullainathan (2012) on the relation between the lack
of control over local officials and their misbehavior.
5Martinez-Bravo et al. (2014) show that political liberties in rural China lead to a more efficient
provision of public goods. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) relate the franchise expansion occurring in
nineteenth century Britain to the provision of public goods. On the link between market supporting
institutions (e.g., courts and police) and political institutions, see also Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)
and Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2008).
6We define expropriation as the coercive appropriation of an amount of output higher than
the agreed-upon tax. Formally, we treat the administration as a costly technology rather than
a player. In the Online Appendix, we extend the model to treat officials as players whose deci-
sion to expropriate the merchant is unobservable to the ruler. The Online Appendix is available at
https://sites.google.com/site/simonemeragliawebpage/research.
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Conversely, downsizing the local administration involves production inefficiencies when
the demand for law and order is high, which occurs when the gains from trade are
high. To escape the trade-off that arises in a trade economy, the ruler may find that
granting control of the local administration to the merchant is profitable, even though
this makes tax evasion more tempting. Because the merchant is better informed about
the officials’ behavior, he can invest in a stronger local administration that does not
engage in expropriation.
We provide evidence on taxation, commercial importance, and political liberties
across the 496 English boroughs recorded from 1066 to 1307. The data we collect are
coherent with our model in several ways. First, we distinguish between royal boroughs
whose administration was controlled by the king, and mesne boroughs whose admin-
istration was controlled by a local lord. Mesne lords, who controled smaller territories
than the king, were arguably better able to monitor officials and, thus, did not need to
delegate as much control over the local administration to their boroughs. We find that
41% of the royal boroughs obtained local political liberties, against 5% of the mesne
boroughs. Second, we distinguish between boroughs according to their commercial rele-
vance. To sustain larger trade volumes, more commercially important boroughs needed
a larger local administration and were thus more likely to obtain political liberties. We
find that 66% of the 51 most commercially important boroughs were granted liberties,
against only 7% of the remaining 445 less commercially important ones. In particular,
80% of the boroughs that were both royal and commercially important were granted
liberties; by contrast, only 5% of the most commercially important mesne boroughs
and 26% of the less commercially important royal boroughs obtained liberties. These
figures suggest that trade becomes a major determinant of local political liberties only
when the ruler is distant and unable to control her local administration. Finally, we
find that over half of the royal boroughs that obtained Charters made an upfront pay-
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ment and/or paid higher yearly taxes upon (and explicitly in exchange for) the grant.
We observe no decreases in taxes immediately following the first grant. This finding
suggests granting liberties is mutually beneficial to the king and the burgesses.
The main existing theories on trade and political liberties emphasize the role the
merchant class played in the rise of English national representative assemblies (North
and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989), Bates and Lien (1985)). Our focus is
on the impressive – and yet overlooked – spread of political liberties to merchant towns
that preceded their representation in parliament. The analysis of this period reveals
the critical role the local administration played in fostering liberties, and highlights
the process by which the English merchant class gained considerable and long-lasting
power.7
Wars, and the need to finance them, are often considered vital to the evolution of
political liberties (see, e.g., North and Weingast (1989)).8 Wars were common during
our period of study, and indeed many grants of liberties occured either immediately
preceding or immediately following a conflict. Our framework points to a novel channel
through which wars can lead to liberties. Because conflicts were often fought abroad,
the king’s absence from England exacerbated the issue of controlling the local adminis-
tration, as evidenced by the numerous inquiries into officials’ behavior launched upon
his returns.
Finally, rebellions, or their threat, may also lead to political liberties (Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000)).9 In our context, however, the fact that the king received higher
payments from boroughs upon the grant of liberties suggests that, if rebellions played
7See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) on the importance of medieval political institutions
for future institutional developments in Britain.
8On the role played by wars, see also Gennaioli and Voth (2015).
9Rebellions seem crucial in other parts of Western Europe, such as France and Northern Italy,
where citizens organized themselves into communes. In the case of England, only three attempts at
rebelling against the king are recorded (i.e., London (1191), Gloucester (1169-70), and York (1176)),
and all three have failed. On the London commune, see Tait (1936).
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a role, they must have often been directed against the local administration rather than
the king.
Related Literature. Our paper continues a stream of literature on the relationship
between local political liberties and the issue of controlling the bureaucracy.10 Bardhan
(2002) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) investigate this issue in the presence of
corruptible officials. A premise of this research is that communication between citizens
and rulers is costly. Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009) analyze the role of free media in
alleviating this problem of communication.
A strand of the literature explains autocrats’ handover of power to citizens, by
arguing their enfranchisement makes expropriation less tempting to rulers (North and
Weingast (1989), Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994)). In the same vein, North and
Thomas (1973) and De Long and Shleifer (1993) highlight the link between the rise of
trade and the arrival of more open forms of political institutions. Bates and Lien (1985)
emphasize rulers’ difficulty in taxing movable wealth in explaining the rise of western
European representative assemblies.11 In Myerson (2015), constitutional constraints,
by making expropriations of officials less tempting to rulers, also favor the rise of a
privileged aristocracy.
Horowitz (1993) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) analyze the path of economic
and political reforms in the presence of a threat of social unrest. Lizzeri and Persico
(2004) show that an expansion of the franchise may occur even in the absence of the
threat of a revolt. Specifically, it may occur when the need for public goods is sufficiently
high.
10De Lara, Greif and Jha (2008) point out how administrative power is an important determinant
of self-enforcing representative systems.
11Interestingly, their focus is on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As we highlight in this
paper, by that time the administration of the most commercially important English boroughs was
controlled by merchants. Presumably, this has exacerbated rulers’ difficulty in taxing movable wealth.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the historical context. Section
3 presents the model setting. Sections 4 and 5 solve the model. Section 6 provides
quantitative and qualitative evidence on trade, taxation, and local political liberties in
England (1066-1307). Section 7 concludes.
2 The Historical Context
Territorial Administration. Post-Norman Conquest England was divided into
shires/counties, themselves divided into hundreds. Each hundred was composed of
manors within which rural and urban settlements – villages and boroughs – coexisted.
The presence of a market and a trading community characterized urban settlements.
Unlike villagers, burgesses could alienate their land property and pay a cash rent to
the manorial lord rather than provide labor services.12 In what follows, we focus on
boroughs because of their greater importance.
The person with the highest authority over an area was its owner: either the king
or a local (mesne) lord. According to the Domesday Book (1086), approximately 20%
of the land belonged to the king, 55% to lay mesne lords, and 25% to ecclesiastical
mesne lords. Although mesne lords were tied to the king by feudal obligations, they
were entitled to receive almost the entirety of their land’s profits.
The king and mesne lords appointed the officials who enforced the law and collected
taxes in their respective territories. On the royal demesne, the king appointed sheriffs
at the shire level, and either the sheriff or the king appointed bailiffs at the hundred
level. Similarly, reeves were appointed in boroughs and villages (Tait (1936), p. 225).
Officials had fiscal and judicial authority within their jurisdiction, and each responded
12Ballard (1913) (pp. xliv and lxxxviii-lxxxix). Burgesses could move as part of their trading
activity. However, acquiring the status of burgess in a borough other than that determined by birth
was very difficult in practice.
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to the officials with wider jurisdiction.13 The range of officials on the mesne lords’
territories was almost identical to that on the royal demesne, except for sheriffs who
were unnecessary on mesne lords’ small territories.
Boroughs, Markets, and Trade. The period under consideration was one of boom-
ing economic activity. The number of recorded urban settlements increased drastically:
boroughs went from 112 in 1086 to approximately 500 by 1307. Around 150 fairs were
established by the end of the twelfth century and more than 1,000 newly licensed mar-
kets were recorded between 1200 and 1349.14 Coinage in circulation increased both in
nominal terms – from £25,000 to £900,000 – and per capita (Mayhew (1995)). Richard
I introduced the first national customs tariff. In 1203-4, a total of £4,958 were collected
from 35 ports, a sum equal to the total value of all mesne lords’ lands as recorded in the
Domesday Book (Langdon and Masschaele (2006)). Traded goods included agricultural
produce, food, rural industrial products (cloth), and manufactures.
Beginning in about 1160, the king licensed all English markets in exchange for
an up-front fee. A license gave the market holder the right to build the necessary
infrastructure, hold the market on a given day of the week, hold the market court, and
collect various tolls (Davis (2011)). The king imposed limitations on the rates of tolls
and charges to be levied from traders (Britnell (1978) and Masschaele (1997)). Market
holders appointed market officials to monitor exchanges, whereas clerks of the market
– officials of the king’s household – monitored the enforcement of market regulations.
Often, mesne lords were license holders on their demesne.
13See Ballard (1913) and Green (1989). Other officials existed, such as shire justiciars, itinerant
justices, justices in eyre, coroners, under-sheriffs, itinerant serjeants, serjeants of the hundreds, clerks,
bedels, sub-bedels, cacherels, summoners, messengers, and toll collectors (Cam (1963), pp. 132-33,
153-56).
14Britnell (1981), Masschaele (1997), and Langdon and Masschaele (2006). In 1189, the proceeds
of the fair of St. Giles – still in existence – amounted to £146 8s. 7d., a sum comparable to the yearly
profits the king received from his wealthiest boroughs (Poole (1955), p. 77).
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A Growing Administration. Several facts suggest a growing local administration.
Each of the some 1,000 newly licensed markets required several officials, such as toll
collectors, weighers and measurers, ale tasters, bread weighers, viewers of the market,
and so on. New offices were created, for instance, clerks of the market and keepers of
the peace (in charge of protecting trade routes).15 Finally, several statutes addressed
the need for registered commercial contracts and more speedy dispute resolution by
allowing more frequent sittings of existing courts and establishing new ones (Statute
of Acton Burnell (1283), Statute of Merchants (1285), and Statute of Westminster II
(1285, c. 18)).16
Tax Farming. Court fees, tolls, and market licence fees were significant sources of
profits for the king and mesne lords.17 The contractual arrangement between the king
and his officials was known as tax farming. The farm of a territory was a fixed amount
of money representing the sum of all the king’s revenues from that territory. The king
auctioned off the right to collect the farm. The winning official retained any revenue in
excess of his bid, and the king enjoyed an increment whenever this bid was higher than
the farm.18,19 The farmer’s profit mostly stemmed from the handling of court disputes.20
However, caps and limits were imposed on the admissible fees and the frequency with
which courts were to be held.
15Toll collectors proliferated (Masschaele (1997)). Also, from Henry II’s reign onward, the sheriff’s
men grew significantly more numerous (Cam (1963), pp. 6-7).
16Ballard and Tait (1923), p. lxix; Tait (1936); Poole (1955), p. 392; Powicke (1962), p. 623; Cam
(1963), pp. 145-46.
17See Ballard (1904) (pp. 90-91) and Masschaele (1997). Other permanent sources included a land
tax (geld), proceeds from the lord’s demesne houses (gablum), and receipts from mints (Ballard (1904),
pp. 63-64). At times, extraordinary taxes were also collected, such as the aides and tallages.
18The market for the sheriff’s office was fairly competitive under Henry I (Green (1989), p. 201)
and Richard I (Carpenter (1976), Poole (1955), p. 388).
19Farms were customarily fixed and invariant after the Domesday survey. However, presumably
because of the booming economic activity, the king temporarily imposed increments in the thirteenth
century (Cam (1963), p. 94; Carpenter (1976)).
20Round (1892), p. 91; Morris (1968), pp. 98-99.
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The sheriff was responsible for the farm of the shire, and lower-level officials were
accountable to him for the hundreds’ and boroughs’ farms. The sheriff presided over the
shire court, whereas the bailiff and the reeve presided over, respectively, the hundred
and the borough courts. The shire and hundred courts dealt with trespassing and debts,
and registered verbal contracts (Cam (1963), p. 18, p. 115, and pp. 181-3). Moreover,
during his periodical tourns, the sheriff dealt with various offenses, monitored the local
police system (the frankpledge tithings), and received payments (Cam (1963), pp. 70,
89, and 120-23).21 All lower level courts – namely, borough, market, and piepowder
courts – dealt with commercial contracts and handled disputes between merchants.22
Identical courts were found on mesne territories, except for those run by the royal
sheriff.
In 1204, John dismissed many sheriffs and appointed new ones as custodes rather
than farmers. Custodians were meant to transfer all revenues to the Exchequer –
minus allowed expenses – and became paid officials entitled to a salary. This system,
discontinued during the period leading to the Magna Carta, was reimposed in the
periods 1223-24, 1236-41, and in 1258-59 (Powicke (1962), p. 62; Carpenter (1976)).
The farming system was also common within mesne lords’ territories. However, we
are unsure whether auctions were held.
Officials’ Misbehavior. The control of local officials was a significant problem. The
importance of this issue can, for instance, be inferred from the various inquiries and
the legal reforms of the period.
An inquiry occured when the king sent officials from his household to gather and
investigate complaints about local officials. We have records of 21 such inquiries, where
21Pleas related to market transactions could also be dealt with in the sheriff’s tourn.
22Piepowder courts developed in the thirteenth century. According to the Ipswich Dom-Boc (1291),
this court was held in the borough court, and citizens made their pleas before the borough’s bailiff.
See also Powicke (1962) (p. 625) and Gross (1906).
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each inquiry may have lasted up to several years. Inquiries’ surviving records give
a vivid picture of local officials’ exactions. For instance, the Inquest of the Sheriffs
(1170), which led to the removal of most sheriffs and lower level officials, tells us of
reeves extracting unauthorized tolls and of sheriffs abusing shire courts by summoning
burgesses to act as jurors at inconvenient times and places only to fine those unable
to attend.23 Similarly, the Hundred Rolls Inquiries (1274-75) contain complaints in-
volving over 1,000 officials (Cam (1963), p. 229). Sheriffs were accused of imposing
arbitrary financial penalties, making arrests without any formal accusation, refusing
to give proper receipts for payments in order to collect debts twice, and extracting
unauthorized tolls.24
Legal reforms encompass statutes, ordinances, and provisions that explicitly dealt
with the issue of controlling local officials. To the best of our knowledge, at least 34
major reforms (out of a total of ca. 81 pieces of legislation; see Great Britain Public
Record Office (1810) and Rothwell (1995)) contained chapters dealing with this issue
and that either limited officials’ prerogatives or created new offices whose purpose was to
monitor existing officials (and assume some of their responsibilities). For instance, local
shire justiciars and coroners were introduced during the twelfth century to diminish the
sheriff’s judicial prerogatives (Carpenter (1976)). Similarly, the Exchequer – instituted
around 1110 – tightened control over the sheriffs’ financial accounts.25 Sometimes,
reforms aimed at limiting the pervasiveness of the administration. The Magna Carta
(1215-1217), for instance, forbade the shire court from meeting more than once a month,
and the sheriff from making more than two tourns per year. These measures – in times
of growing demand for contract enforcement – are strongly indicative of the high cost the
23Poole (1955), pp. 388-89; Cam (1963), pp. 4-5. In 1213-15, immediately preceding the Magna
Carta, John also launched local inquiries into sheriffs’ malpractices, again leading to the removal of
unpopular sheriffs.
24Cam (1963), pp. 72-73, 94-96, 117-18, 125, 218; Masschaele (1997).
25Cam (1963), and Powicke (1962) (p. 65).
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Figure I: Main Events: England, 1100-1307.
Sources: Great Britain Public Record Office (1810), Wade (1839), Eyton (1878), Stenton (1966), Warren (1987), Prest-
wich (1988), Holt (1992), Rothwell (1995).
Notes: Because Henry III was a minor at the beginning of his reign, we treat 1216 and 1227 as two distinct coronation
dates. For a detailed chronology of the events contained in Figure I, see Table VI in Appendix 2.
king incurred to control officials’ behavior.26 Presumably, the king’s experimentation
with custodian sheriffs was also a response to the population’s grievances.
Figure I presents the chronology of inquiries and reforms. It also reports the king’s
(and much of his household’s) periods of absence from England (often because of wars).
Figure I is instructive in several ways. First, 20 of the 21 inquiries occured either
during or immediately following a period of absence, and legal reforms tended to follow
inquiries.27 Second, 7 of the 10 legal reforms that created new offices took place either
immediately preceding, during, or immediately following periods of absence. These
26The Statute of Merchants (1285) states that (i) speedy justice is needed to support trade, (ii)
the sheriffs meant to provide it abused their position, and (iii) justice to merchants is therefore the
responsability of mayors elected by burgesses.
27See, for instance, the royal document entitled Enquiry into offences by royal officials during the
king’s absence 1286-9 (1289). Legal reforms often addressed the offenses recorded in the inquiries.
For instance, the Statute of Westminster I (1275) provided that toll franchises could be revoked were
excessive tolls to be charged. See Powicke (1962), pp. 356-59, 625, and Cam (1963), pp. 226-27.
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patterns suggest the king’s ability to control his local administration was weakened
when he was absent from England.
Summary:
• Boroughs either belonged to the king or to local mesne lords. Local lords received
all of their boroughs’ revenues and had full discretion over their administration.
• Officials administered justice and collected taxes within boroughs. They were
allowed to retain the revenues extracted in excess of the payments due to the
lord.
• Markets, and the officials that administered them, increased drastically over time.
• Officials engaged in widespread misbehavior. To address this issue, the king had
no choice but to monitor their behavior and adopt costly administrative measures.
3 The Model Setting
We consider the interaction between a ruler R (e.g., the king or a local lord) and a
representative merchant M (e.g., burgess). Both players are risk neutral. For simplicity,
we treat the local administration as a costly technology. In the Online Appendix, we
extend the model to treat the administration as a player.
Let t ∈ R+ denote the agreed-upon lump-sum tax to be transferred by M to R, and
q ∈ R+, the size of/investment in the local administration. The local administration
provides law and order, which is an input in the production technology y (q) owned
by M . The higher the number of local officials and/or the broader the scope of their
responsibilities, the greater their ability to enforce contracts or protect trade routes,
and thus the higher the potential output. The size of the local administration also
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determines an appropriation function f (q), which represents the maximum amount of
output that can be appropriated coercively from M . We assume y (q) and f (q) are
both non-decreasing and concave, with f(0) = 0. In line with our historical context,
officials who provide law and order are also in charge of collecting taxes.28
Players interact repeatedly. At the beginning of each period, R decides whether
to grant M the right to choose (t, q). Letting M choose q amounts to granting him
the right to appoint local officials. Given an allocation of decision rights over (t, q) and
choice q, M decides whether to produce y (q) or exit the economy. If production occurs,
players share the output through either taxation t or coercive appropriation f(q).
Ruler. R chooses I ∈ {R,M}, where I denotes the player with decision rights over
(t, q). The other elements in R’s action space Ω
R
depend on I:
ΩR (I) =
 {q, t, e} if I = R,∅ if I = M.
If I = R, R decides whether to coercively appropriate output from M (e = 1) or not
(e = 0). If I = M , e = 0 necessarily. In words, when R grants M control of the local
administration, she loses the ability to coercively appropriate output from him. R’s
payoff is:
V (t, q, I) = T (t, q, I)− CR(t, q, I), (1)
where T (t, q, I) represents the amount of output accruing to R, and C
R
(t, q, I) is the
cost to R of the local administration. Anticipating the description of M ’s action space,
T (t, q, R) is either equal to (i) the tax t or (ii) the minimum between f(q) and y(q),
whereas T (t, q,M) is either equal to the tax t or zero. We set R’s reservation utility to
zero.
28A model in which the two tasks are separated leads to qualitatively identical results as long as
one recognizes coercive power is needed to provide law and order.
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Merchant. M ’s action space Ω
M
as a function of I ∈ {R,M} is:
ΩM (I) =
 {Y, a} if I = R,{Y, a, t, q} if I = M,
where a ∈ {0, 1} represents M ’s choice to pay the tax t (a = 1) or not (a = 0), and
Y (q) ∈ {0, y(q)} denotes M ’s decision to produce (Y = y (q)) or not (Y = 0). M ’s
payoff is:
U(t, q, I) = y(q)− T (t, q, I)− CM (t, q, I), (2)
where C
M
(t, q, I) is the cost to M of the local administration. Finally, let u
M
> 0
denote M ’s reservation utility.29
Cost of the Local Administration. Suppose first R controls the local administra-
tion, i.e., I = R.
To explain the cost of investing in the local administration, we rely on the findings
of the Online Appendix in which local officials are treated as infinitely lived players.
There, R needs to convince each of her q appointed officials to both (i) collect a specific
amount of output from M and (ii) transfer a share of this collected output to her. R
ensures compliance by choosing the share of collected output each official is allowed to
retain and by firing those who fail to make payments. Inducing officials to transfer part
of the collected ouptut is always a concern to R and determines a minimum amount
c each official must retain. The marginal cost of an administration of size q is thus
at least equal to c. Preventing officials from extracting more than a specific amount
of output (i.e., engaging in expropriation) can also be a concern: because R cannot
observe the amount officials actually extract from M , she must sometimes allow them
29We require u
M
> 0 for M ’s participation – and therefore expropriation – to be a concern. For
instance, u
M
can be interpreted as either the minimum level of output that guarantees subsistence to
M , or his payoff when moving somewhere else.
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to retain a higher share of output.30 In this case, the marginal cost of investing in the
local administration is equal to c > c.
The cost to R of investing in the local administration, for a given tax t, is:
CR(t, q, R) =

cq if e = 1,
cq if e = 0 and t ≥ f(q),
cq + ∆c (q − q˜(t)) if e = 0 and t < f(q),
(3)
where ∆c = c − c > 0, and where q˜(t) denotes the value of q such that t = f(q).
When I = M , C
R
(t, q,M) = 0; that is, M bears the cost of investing in the local
administration.
When e = 1, the total cost of the local administration is low. Because R is only
tempted to play e = 1 either when f(q) > t or when M has reneged on t, officials cannot
possibly extract from M more than instructed by R.31 When e = 0 and the number of
officials q is such that f(q) ≤ t (i.e., q ≤ q˜(t)), again each official cannot extract from M
more than instructed, and thus the cost of investing in the local administration is low.
By contrast, the cost of the local administration is high when e = 0 even though its size
q is large enough (i.e., q > q˜(t)) that officials could unobservably expropriate M (i.e.,
extract f(q) > t), transfer t to R, and pocket the difference. The term ∆c (q − q˜(t))
represents the total additional rent that R must give up to the local administration to
prevent expropriation.32
30The misalignment of incentives between R and her administration can occur because, on the
one hand, trade involves transactions across different markets and, on the other hand, each official
administers only a few markets. As the number of markets increases, each official tends to internalize
less its disruption on trade on R’s entire territory.
31We should also state the cost to R of playing e = 1 when M is willing to pay t and f(q) ≤ t. We
do not state this cost because e = 1 would amount to instructing officials to extract less than what M
is willing to pay.
32English kings experimented with two contractual arrangements with their local officials. In the
first arrangement, local officials acted as tax farmers. The king fixed a reservation price and the farmers
bid for the right to collect a borough’s taxes. Tax farmers retained the amount of money collected
in excess of their bid, although they were subject to caps. In the second arrangement, officials were
appointed as custodians entitled to a salary. The model in the Online Appendix captures the main
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When I = M , the cost of controlling the local administration is borne entirely by
M and C
M
(t, q,M) = cq.33 M is perfectly able to observe the amount officials extract
from him, and fires them if necessary.34 Therefore, the only rent the officials receive is
that needed to ensure they make the appropriate payment to R.
Timing. The game is infinitely repeated in discrete time τ = 0, 1, ... . Let β
M
, β
R
∈
[0, 1) denote the players’ discount factors. The timing of the stage game is the following:
1. Grant Stage: R chooses Iτ ∈ {R,M};
2. Investment Stage: Player Iτ chooses (tτ , qτ );
3. Production Stage: M chooses Yτ ∈ {0, y (qτ )}. If Yτ = 0, players enjoy their
reservation utilities, and the period ends;
4. Transfer Stage:
(a) M chooses aτ ∈ {0, 1};
(b) If Iτ = R, R chooses eτ ∈ {0, 1};
(c) Tτ is transferred from M to R.
The choice of Iτ is made at the beginning of every period τ , implying the revocation
of decision rights is possible. Revocations are costless to R and, as we discuss in Section
6, not uncommon in our period of interest.
trade-offs arising under both systems.
33When I = R, R bears the cost of the local administration and, therefore, C
M
(t, q, R) = 0.
34Burgesses selected officials from among themselves. Because officials were no longer backed by
the lord, punishing them was not an offense. Also, the right to assemble fostered coordination among
burgesses. Finally, historical evidence suggests the turnover of borough officials was significant (see,
e.g., Reynolds (1972)).
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When I = R, stage 4 should be thought of as a subgame in which R’s officials
collect taxes from M under the threat of coercion. If in stage 4.a M agrees to transfer
t to R’s officials, in stage 4.b officials can at most expropriate an amount equal to
max[f(q) − t, 0] by employing coercion. Formally, when a = 1 and e = 1, R collects
max[t, f(q)].
We consider equilibria in which R either retains decision rights over (t, q) or grants
them to M . In the first case, we seek the equilibrium that guarantees the highest possi-
ble payoff to R. In the second case, we seek the equilibrium that guarantees the highest
possible payoff to M , subject to R being better off granting decision-rights. Focusing
on these equilibria is conservative in so far as the associated necessary conditions for a
grant to occur are the most difficult to meet.
Manorial and Trade Economies. We define the trade (manorial) economy as the
economy in which gains from trade are high (low). In the manorial economy, the output
is independent of q and equal to y, where y > u
M
(i.e., enough output is produced to
maintain M at least at the subsistence level). In the trade economy, the output is y(q),
where y(0) = y: gains from trade make the production of output more responsive to
the provision of law and order (see Greif (1993) and Dixit (2003)).To ease exposition,
we use the term “merchant” in both the manorial and the trade economies, and we
assume u
M
is independent of the type of economy we consider.
Technical Assumptions. In the trade economy, let g(q, u
M
) := y(q) − f(q) − u
M
.
This function represents the difference between (i) M ’s payoff when R coercively appro-
priates the produced output and (ii) M ’s reservation utility. Furthermore, let q∗(c) de-
note the size of the local administration that maximizes the surplus S(q, c) := [y(q)−cq].
We assume the following:
(A1) g(q∗, u
M
) < 0, and
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(A2) g(q, u
M
) is concave in q.
A1 is an assumption regarding the efficient size of the local administration: we
assume the trade economy requires a sufficiently large local administration that, if its
efficient size is chosen, M does not produce when he expects output to be appropriated
coercively. A1 allows us to focus on the case of interest: if A1 is reversed, R never
grants decision rights, because the expropriation of M by local officials is not enough of
a concern. A2 ensures the uniqueness of the solution in the static game. It also allows
us to do comparative statics on players’ discount factors. This assumption, however,
has no qualitative impact on the results regarding delegation.35
4 The One-Period Game
Suppose R and M interact for one period only. We denote by (ts, qs) the equilib-
rium tax and size of the local administration, respectively. Similarly, Is denotes R’s
equilibrium choice to grant M decision rights over (t, q). We solve the game by back-
ward induction. Suppose I = R. Given R’s choice of q, we necessarily have t = f(q),
because R would not find it profitable to request t < f(q), and M would not agree to
pay t > f(q).36
If I = R, T (t, q, R) = f(q) and, given (3), C
R
(t, q, R) = cq. R solves:
max
{q}
[f(q)− cq]
s.t. y(q)− f(q) ≥ u
M
, (4)
where (4) is M ’s participation constraint (PC).37
35Possible functional forms include y(q) = y+ θ
√
q and f(q) = γq. The manorial economy is one in
which θ = 0. A1 holds and a sufficiently high value of γ ensures A2 also holds.
36We interpret an equilibrium in which t = f(q) as one in which coercion occurs.
37It must be that min[y(q), f(q)] = f(q); for otherwise, PC would be violated.
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Proposition 1 In the one-period game, R retains decision rights; that is, Is = R. An
inefficiently small size of the local administration characterizes the trade economy (i.e.,
qs < q∗), and conversely for the manorial economy.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
In the manorial economy, the efficient size of the local administration is small be-
cause of the low demand for contract enforcement. However, because (i) M cannot
commit to paying a tax greater than what can be coercively appropriated and (ii) R
maximizes revenues, R chooses an inefficiently large size of the local administration.
In the trade economy, the efficient size of the local administration is relatively large.
However, R’s lack of commitment not to expropriate M implies a smaller than efficient
size of the local administration to ensure M ’s participation.
In either type of economy, if R were to grant decision-rights, M would choose the
efficient size of the local administration. Despite this efficiency gain, in either case, R
does not grant M control of the local administration, because she anticipates M would
ultimately escape taxation.
5 Infinitely Repeated Game
We define the history of a game hτ = (Iτ , qτ , Y τ , tτ , aτ , eτ ) as the collection of
sequences of past actions taken by players from period 0 until τ −1. A subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) is given by R’s choice of IE
τ
given history hτ , qE
τ
given {hτ , Iτ},
M ’s output production Y E
τ
given {hτ , Iτ , qτ}, a tax tEτ given {hτ , Iτ , qτ , Yτ}, a choice aEτ
given {hτ , Iτ , qτ , Yτ , tτ}, and the coercive appropriation choice eEτ as a function of the
history {hτ , Iτ , qτ , Yτ , tτ , aτ}.
R and M play stationary trigger strategies in which each player threatens to revert
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to the one-period stage game forever after a deviation from the equilibrium (tE, qE) is
detected at any stage in period τ or in any previous period τ ′ = 0, ..., τ−1. Specifically,
if the cooperation phase involves the grant of decision rights to M , the punishment
phase is such that R revokes them in all subsequent periods. This strategy matches
our historical account: the king revokes burgesses’ right to control their own borough
administration when they fail to transfer the promised amount of taxes.
Players’ deviations from (tE, qE) depend on IE. If IE = R, R can deviate at the
investment and transfer stages, and M can deviate at the production and transfer
stages. The temptation to deviate at the transfer stage occurs because of the difference
between tE and f(qE). If the former is greater than the latter, the temptation to deviate
rests on M , and vice versa. Finally, if IE = M , R cannot deviate at any stage, whereas
M can deviate at the investment and transfer stages.
We characterize both players’ relevant constraints in the case of the trade economy.
The constraints of the manorial economy are identical, except y(q) = y.
We first analyze the case in which IE = R. Consider some pair (tE, qE). M ’s
participation constraint (PC) is given by (4), where we substitute in tE for f(q). M ’s
incentive compatibility constraint (IC(M)) at the transfer stage is:
y(qE)− tE
1− βM
≥ [y(qE)− T (tE , qE , R)] + βM
1− βM
U s,
where U s denotes M ’s utility in the one-period stage game (see Proposition 1). By de-
viating at the transfer stage, M triggers coercive appropriation T (tE, qE, R) = f(qE).38
We now analyze R’s incentive to deviate from (tE, qE). The difference between tE
and f(qE) affects R’s temptation to deviate at both the investment and the transfer
stages. If a deviation occurs at the investment stage, M anticipates coercive appro-
38Note M produces y(qE) also when he plans to deviate at the transfer stage because (i) a deviation
is rational only when tE > f(qE) and (ii) tE must necessarily satisfy PC. Also, because of (i) and
(ii), we have T (tE , qE , R) = min[y(qE), f(qE)] = f(qE).
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priation, and thus R chooses q as in the one-period game. R’s incentive compatibility
constraint at the investment stage (ICI(R)) is:
tE − cqE
1− βR
≥ [f(qs)− cqs] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs],
where ICI(R) is independent of β
R
, and where the marginal cost of investing in the
administration of size qE is equal to c.39 ICI(R) simplifies to:
tE − cqE ≥ f(qs)− cqs = V s. (5)
R’s deviation at the transfer stage is relevant only if tE < f(qE), and the associated
incentive compatibility constraint (ICT(R)) is:
tE − CR(tE , qE , R)
1− βR
≥ [min[y(qE), f(qE)]− cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs]. (6)
Given (3), when R expropriates M , the marginal cost of investing in q is equal to c in
the first term on the right-hand side (RHS).
Lemma 1 Let IE = R. When tE > f(qE), R is tempted to deviate at the investment
stage only. When tE ≤ f(qE), R is tempted to deviate at the transfer stage only.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Suppose now IE = M . Consider some pair (tE, qE). M ’s participation constraint
(PC) is given by (4), where we substitute in tE for f(q). IC(M) is:
y(qE)− tE − cqE
1− βM
≥ [y(qE)− cqE ] + βM
1− βM
U s,
where M bears the cost of the local administration. Because R cannot employ coercion,
39As we formally show in Lemma 1, ICI(R) is relevant only when tE > f(qE). Therefore, from (3),
we have C
R
(tE , qE , R) = cqE .
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M invests in the efficient size of the administration regardless of his decision to pay
t. Therefore, a deviation by M at the investment stage is irrelevant. Also, because R
grants control of the administration to M , her deviations at the investment and transfer
stages are irrelevant.
We proceed by first characterizing the pair (tR, qR) that guarantees the highest
payoff to R in the subgame in which she retains decision-rights over (t, q). We then
analyze the conditions under which a pair (tM , qM) exists which guarantees the highest
payoff to M in the subgame in which he obtains decision rights, subject to R being
better off making a grant.
5.1 The No-Grant Case
Suppose Iτ = R, ∀τ . In each period τ , R solves:
max
{t,q}
[t− CR(t, q, R)],
s.t. PC, IC(M), ICI(R), ICT(R).
We divide the analysis between the manorial economy and the trade economy cases.
The Manorial Economy. Because the concern is M ’s possible deviation at the
transfer stage, we anticipate that R’s constraints are slack, and verify this is true in
Appendix 1. The pair (tR, qR) is then the solution to:
max
{q}
βM {[y − f(q)]− U s]}+ f(q)− CR(t, q, R), (7)
s.t. PC.
Lemma 2 Let Iτ = R, ∀τ . In the manorial economy, the equilibrium investment
qR(c, β
M
) lies between the efficient level q∗(c) = 0 and the “one-period-game” level
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qs(c), and is independent of R’s shortsightedness. Also, tR > f(qR). All else equal, the
less shortsighted M is, the closer the economy is to efficiency.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
In the manorial economy, demand for law and order is low. If R were to choose
the efficient size of the administration q∗(c) = 0, M would pay taxes only if sufficiently
longsighted. If M is shortsighted, R has no choice but to invest in the administration
to collect taxes under the threat of coercion. Because tR > f(qR) in equilibrium,
expropriating M is not tempting and the cost of the administration is low.
On the medieval English agricultural manors, feudal lords appointed officials whose
main purpose was to collect taxes from the peasantry. Stewards and bailiffs ensured
the lord appropriated a sufficiently high share of the output proceeds, whereas reeves
supervised peasants’ agricultural labor on the lord’s estate.
The Trade Economy. In addition to the issue of controlling the local administration
(see (3)), the concern is R’s temptation to deviate at the transfer stage. Therefore, we
anticipate PC and ICT(R) are binding. In each period τ , R solves:
max
{q}
[y(q)− u
M
− CR(t, q, R)]
s.t. ICT(R),
where we have substituted PC in the objective function. From (3), let q◦ denote the
(constrained) efficient investment when expropriation is an issue; that is, q◦(c, c) :=
arg maxq [y(q)− cq −∆c (q − q˜)].
Lemma 3 Suppose Iτ = R, ∀τ . In the trade economy, the investment qR(c, c, βR) lies
between the “one-period-game” level qs(c) and the constrained efficient level q◦(c, c) <
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q∗(c), and is independent of M ’s shortsightedness. Also, tR < f(qR). All else equal, the
less shortsighted R is, the closer the economy is to constrained efficiency.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
In the trade economy, demand for law and order is relatively high. However, choosing
the efficient level of investment q∗(c) makes expropriating M feasible. As we discuss
in (3), when expropriation is feasible, the cost of investing in the local administration
is high, and alone implies an inefficiently small investment (i.e., q◦(c, c) < q∗(c)). In
addition, when R induces her officials to expropriate M , she (i) appropriates more
revenues than those from taxation and (ii) saves on the cost of controlling local officials.
Therefore, if R is sufficiently shortsighted, she is forced to distort the investment q even
further to reduce her temptation.40
The historical account made by Roger of Howden – a cleric close to Henry II –
provides an example of the distortion incurred to avoid expropriation:
“Staying in England, the lord-king questioned the justices he had appointed
in England whether they had treated the people of the realm with decent
restraint.” And when he learned that the people were “overly oppressed”
by an excessive “multitude” of justices, the king [...] decided to reduce the
number of justices from eighteen to five [...]. (Bisson (2009), p. 379).
As several royal statutes indicate, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the in-
crease in trade led to a growing demand for law and order. Lords’ borough officials –
for example, bailiffs and reeves – collected taxes and presided over courts that increas-
ingly delt with commercial contracts. At the same time, however, important legislative
reforms – for example, the Magna Carta (reissued in 1217) – were made following the
40One can also show that higher values of u
M
imply, all else equal, a higher temptation for R to
expropriate M . If u
M
= 0, R can choose the efficient investment (q∗(c)) and extract the entire surplus.
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population’s complaints about officials’ behavior and limited the latter’s prerogatives
by decreasing the frequency of court sittings.
5.2 Granting Decision Rights
Granting M decision rights over (t, q) affects both the equilibrium size of the local
administration and the equilibrium tax R can appropriate. Because of M ’s superior
ability to monitor local officials, the cost to M of investing in the local administration
is (weakly) lower than the cost that R would bear absent a grant. However, a grant
also exacerbates M ’s temptation to escape taxation, because it gives him control over
local tax collectors.
Proposition 2 Granting decision rights over the local administration can be profitable
for the Ruler in the trade economy only. Specifically, the Ruler grants decision rights
provided the Merchant is sufficiently longsighted not to escape taxation. When it occurs,
a grant is mutually beneficial and leads to an efficient size of the local administration.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
In the manorial economy, the efficient size of the local administration is small. As
a consequence, expropriation is not a concern and the cost to R of controlling the local
administration is low when at its efficient size. However, because of M ’s temptation
to escape taxation, R retains decision rights and invests in an inefficiently large local
administration whose sole purpose is to collect taxes.
In the trade economy, the efficient size of the local administration is relatively large.
Unlike in the manorial economy, expropriation is a concern and implies a high cost
to R of controlling the local officials. As a consequence, the associated investment
in the local administration is inefficiently small. If R grants M decision rights, this
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inefficiency disappears because M is able to control the local administration at a low
cost. Therefore, in the trade economy, a grant occurs whenever M is sufficiently patient
not to escape taxation once endowed with decision rights.41
In our framework, a grant can occur even when R is perfectly patient. Nevertheless,
the more shortsighted R is, the higher her willingness to grant M decision rights.
As discussed earlier, officials’ misbehavior forced the king to distort the provision
of law and order (e.g., by limiting court sittings). This kind of measure - in a time of
growing demand for contract enforcement - strikes us as strongly indicative of the high
cost the king incurred to control officials. Over time, an alternative response emerged:
the king granted Charters of Liberties, allowing the community of burgesses to elect
their own borough officials.
Finally, from Proposition 2, we can infer that a grant would never occur if R’s and
M ’s cost of controlling the local administration were the same.
From Model to History: Predictions. In our framework, high gains from trade
and the ruler’s difficulty in controlling the local administration are necessary conditions
for the emergence of local political liberties. In Section 2, we presented quantitative
and qualitative evidence supporting these two main premises. Our theory also predicts:
Prediction 1: All else equal, rulers who bear a higher cost of monitoring their local
officials are more willing to delegate control of the local administration to burgesses.
Prediction 2: All else equal, provided the ruler bears a high cost of monitoring her
officials, more commercially developed boroughs are more likely to be granted political
liberties.
Prediction 3: When granted, liberties are mutually profitable to the ruler and the
41One can show that, all else equal, the higher u
M
is, the higher the temptation to expropriate, and
therefore the more likely a grant is to occur.
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borough.
To verify these predictions, in the following section, we present data on ownership,
taxation, commercial importance, and the spread of local political liberties across En-
glish boroughs (1066-1307).
6 Trade and Liberties
Charters of Liberties. Over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the king and
mesne lords granted their boroughs numerous Charters of Liberties. Boroughs typically
received more than one Charter, with earlier Charters including the most basic liberties
(e.g., the right to hold a market and have a borough court). Starting with Henry
I, many boroughs obtained the right and obligation to collect the borough farm.42
Importantly, this grant also implied the right for burgesses to elect all the officials
in charge of the financial and judicial administration of the borough, such as reeves,
coroners, and market officials.43 In addition to these prerogatives, burgesses often
obtained (i) the right to have all disputes pleaded in the borough court exclusively and
(ii) that the sheriff be forbidden from entering the borough (non-intromittat clause).44
Following Henry II’s reign, grants often became perpetual (fee-farm), although subject
to revocation in case burgesses failed to transfer the farm to the Exchequer.45
Burgesses assembled in the borough’s main square or in the borough court to elect
42The Charters to Lincoln and London in 1130 and 1131 were the first two grants of these liberties
in post-Norman Conquest England.
43Gross (1906), p. 239; Ballard (1913), pp. lxxxvi-lxxxvii; Tait (1936), p. 186. Because borough
officials also collected taxes on merchants coming from different boroughs, burgesses – once in control
of the local administration – may have been tempted to extract high taxes from those merchants.
However, the king forbade this practice and enforced limits to taxes on trade.
44See Ballard (1913) and Ballard and Tait (1923) (p. lxi).
45For instance, such failure to transfer the farm happened in Cambridge (1189) and York (1190).
Other reasons can explain the revocation of liberties. Henry II withdrew London’s prerogatives in 1154,
possibly because of its failure to support Henry’s mother during the civil war. Gloucester’s liberties
were revoked in 1169-70 after having attempted to form a commune (Tait (1936), pp. 176-77).
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Table I: Number of Boroughs: England, 1066-1307
Period Nr. Royal Boroughs Nr. Mesne Boroughs Nr. Unclassified Boroughs Total
1066-1216 104 152 10 250*
1217-1307 132 373 24 496*
Main Sources: Beresford and Finberg (1973), Letters et al. (2003), British History Online (2015).
Notes: (*) Because boroughs’ ownership can change within and/or across periods, the total number of boroughs does
not match the sum of royal, mesne, and unclassified boroughs.
officials for fixed periods of time.46 The ability to assemble, that of choosing a fellow
burgess, combined with the fact that officials were no longer backed by the king, allowed
boroughs to replace officials when necessary (see Davis (2011), pp. 166-67).
Prediction 1. We collect data on the number of English boroughs, the nature of their
ownership (royal vs. mesne), taxation, and the control of the borough administration
between 1066 and 1307. This information mostly comes from the digitized version of
original medieval documents (e.g., Charters and letter patents collected in the Pipe
Rolls, Charter Rolls, Fine Rolls, Close Rolls, and Patent Rolls). To obtain the number
of boroughs, we use the primary data collected by Beresford and Finberg (1973) and
Letters et al. (2003). For borough Charters, we also rely on Ballard (1913) and Ballard
and Tait (1923).
We know of 496 boroughs as of 1307. Among these, 150 (377) were under royal
(mesne) control for the entire period or a part of it. Also, 55 boroughs changed hands
at least once during the period, and we are unable to attribute ownership to 25 boroughs
for the entire period or a part of it. Table I provides the number of royal, mesne, and
unclassified boroughs recorded in the periods 1066-1216 and 1217-1307. As the table
shows, the number of boroughs increased significantly from one period to the next.
Table II presents the number of grants to burgesses of the right to control their own
46See the Charter John granted to Ipswich in 1200, reported in Ballard (1913). For instance, the
lists of officials elected in London and Exeter suggest significant turnover seems to have occurred
(Jenkins (1841), Reynolds (1972)).
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local administration in royal, mesne, and unclassified boroughs. The king made grants
to royal boroughs, whereas mesne lords made grants to mesne boroughs. To focus
on the spread of grants, we do not take into account confirmations of older ones.47
Royal grants are more numerous and occured earlier than grants to mesne boroughs
(see also Figure II below). Our model can explain these distinct patterns if one believes
that mesne lords, being geographically close to their officials, were better able than the
king to monitor their behavior, and therefore less willing to grant liberties. Indeed, even
though some mesne lords controlled large areas (i.e., earls, barons, and bishops), at least
half of the mesne boroughs belonged to lords owning small territories 48,49 Coherent
with this rationale, our data include two instances (no instances) in which liberties
were immediately revoked (granted) when boroughs passed from royal to mesne hands.
Similarly, we observe one instance (no instances) in which liberties were immediately
granted (revoked) when boroughs pass from mesne to royal hands.50
We also have information on partial grants of liberties. We document 33 instances
(8 instances) in which mesne lords (the king) grant burgesses the right to elect single
officials, while retaining the right to appoint all remaining officials.51 Combining these
facts with Table II, we observe that, when mesne lords granted liberties, they tended
to do so to a much lesser extent than the king.
We interpret the non-observance of a grant in a given borough as evidence of the
47Often, new kings confirmed previously granted Charters. Counting them as new grants would
overestimate the phenomenon of interest. A full data set is available from the authors upon request.
48For the same reason, mesne lords’ territories included fewer markets than the king’s territory.
As a consequence, mesne lords may not have internalized as much the consequences of their officials’
misbehavior.
49Many of the grants to mesne boroughs recorded in Table II can be attributed to these large mesne
landowners. Moreover, surviving historical anecdotes suggest ecclesiastical lords – who owned 133
boroughs in total by 1307 – were the least prone to grant political liberties to burgesses.
50Liverpool and Newcastle under Lyme lost their liberties when they became mesne boroughs in
about 1266 and 1292, respectively (Ballard and Tait (1923), p. lvi). By contrast, Chester became
royal in around 1237 and was granted liberties in 1239.
51In many instances, elected officials in mesne boroughs were subordinated to those the lord ap-
pointed. Elected mayors appeared by the beginning of the thirteenth century.
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Table II: Number of Boroughs Farmed by Burgesses: 1066-1307
Period Nr. Royal Grants Nr. Mesne Grants Nr. Unclassified Grants Total
1066-1216 38 2 0 40
1217-1307 24 13* 0 37*
Total 62 15* 0 77*
Sources: Fine Rolls Henry III (Henry III Fine Rolls Project (2007)), Calendar of the Charter Rolls Henry III - Edward
I (Great Britain Public Record Office, and H. C. Maxwell Lyte, and Stamp, Alfred E. (1908)), Calendar of Patent
Rolls 1216-1307 (Boynton (2003)), Ballard (1913), Ballard and Tait (1923), Tait (1936), Victoria County History (N.d.),
British History Online (2015).
Notes: In some cases, we have a period, rather than a certain date, within which a charter is granted. We select the
mid-point of the period as the date of the charter.
(*): Helston is granted at farm to burgesses by the king in 1201, and by a mesne lord in 1260. We treat Helston as
receiving two separate grants.
absence of a grant. This approach could be a concern in case of missing data. However,
we are confident about our findings for at least three reasons. First, many collections
of official documents have survived to this day, especially royal ones (e.g., Pipe Rolls,
Quo Warranto records). Second, grants were repeatedly confirmed by successive lords,
thereby reducing the probability of missing them. Finally, the king often acknowledged
grants to mesne boroughs (e.g., because of inheritance matters).52
Figure II presents the timing of royal and mesne grants under the successive kings
(no grant is recorded before 1130). John and Henry III stand out as the most active
grantors.53 Interestingly, other major events marked both reigns, such as the large
concessions to both burgesses and barons contained in the Magna Carta and the statutes
of 1258-60. In the years preceding the concessions of 1258-60, grants to boroughs often
included the non-intromittat clause.54
Prediction 2. We assess whether gains from trade are an important determinant of
local political liberties by using two methods.
52Anecdotally, it is not uncommon for boroughs today to annually celebrate the grant of these
liberties and publicly display the original Charter of Liberties.
53Henry III is also the king who most often revoked liberties. For instance, London’s liberties were
revoked several times during his reign.
54The non-intromittat clause was granted to 36 royal boroughs and 11 mesne boroughs.
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Figure II: Timing of Grants: England, 1066-1307.
He
nry
 I (1
100
-35
)
Ste
ph
en
 (11
35-
54)
He
nry
 II 
(11
54-
89)
Ric
ha
rd 
I (1
189
-99
)
Jo
hn
 (11
99-
121
6)
He
nry
 III
 (12
16-
72)
Ed
wa
rd 
I (1
272
-13
07)
0
5
10
15
20
25
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
G
r
a
n
t
s
Royal Boroughs
Mesne Boroughs
Sources: Fine Rolls Henry III (Henry III Fine Rolls Project (2007)), Calendar of the Charter Rolls Henry III - Edward
I (Great Britain Public Record Office, and H. C. Maxwell Lyte, and Stamp, Alfred E. (1908)), Calendar of Patent
Rolls 1216-1307 (Boynton (2003)), Ballard (1913), Ballard and Tait (1923), Tait (1936), Victoria County History (N.d.),
British History Online (2015).
Notes: In some cases, we have a period, rather than a certain date, within which a Charter was granted. We select the
mid-point of the period as the date of the Charter.
In the first method, we divide boroughs according to their commercial relevance as
measured by five criteria as defined in Masschaele (1997) (Chapter 4): (i) presence of a
merchant guild, (ii) representation in Parliament under Edward I, (iii) payment of the
lay subsidies on land and goods (1294-1336) at the urban rate (as opposed to the rural
rate), (iv) status of an urban community in the Nonae Rolls tax records (1340), and
(v) classification as a city or borough in the Nomina Villarum military census (1316).
Table III divides boroughs into three categories. Category A contains 51 boroughs that
satisfy at least four of the five listed criteria, and paid at least £120 in the lay subsidy
of 1334. Category B contains 83 boroughs that satisfy at least four criteria. Category C
contains 120 boroughs that satisfy at least three criteria.55 We also consider the whole
sample of boroughs, and distinguish between royal and mesne boroughs.
In line with Prediction 3, the proportion of royal boroughs farmed by burgesses
increases with commercial relevance.56 No such pattern holds for mesne boroughs.
55In Category C, we disregard 2 boroughs whose ownership is uncertain.
56Note the most commercially developed boroughs tended to be royal.
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Table III: Grants of Liberties and Boroughs’ Commercial Importance by ca.
1300
Category Nr. Royal Boroughs Nr. Royal Grants Nr. Mesne Boroughs Nr. Mesne Grants
A 41 33 (80.48%) 20* 1 (5.00%)
B 60 43 (71.66%) 37* 6** (16.21%)
C 73 49 (67.12%) 65* 8** (12.30%)
All Boroughs 150 62 (41.33%) 377* 15** (3.97%)
Sources: Fine Rolls Henry III (Henry III Fine Rolls Project (2007)), Calendar of the Charter Rolls Henry III - Edward
I (Great Britain Public Record Office, and H. C. Maxwell Lyte, and Stamp, Alfred E. (1908)), Calendar of Patent
Rolls 1216-1307 (Boynton (2003)), Ballard (1913), Ballard and Tait (1923), Tait (1936), Victoria County History (N.d.),
British History Online (2015), Masschaele (1997).
Notes: (*) Some boroughs changed ownership within the period. We count them as both royal and mesne.
(**): Helston is granted at farm to burgesses by the king in 1201, and by a mesne lord in 1260. We treat Helston as
receiving two separate grants.
For the second method, we use boroughs’ geographical characteristics to identify
those with a higher commercial potential. According to historical evidence, in Medieval
England, transporting goods by land was four times more costly than by river, and eight
times more costly than by sea (Masschaele (1993)). Table IV distinguishes between royal
and mesne boroughs located (i) both by the seacoast and at the mouth of a navigable
river, (ii) by the sea-coast, and (iii) on a navigable section of a river.
The information contained in Table IV is coherent with the view that potential
gains from trade are an important determinant of local political liberties for royal bor-
oughs only. In addition, royal boroughs with arguably the most favorable geographical
conditions (i.e., those by the seacoast and at the mouth of a navigable river) show the
highest percentage of grants. These findings are in line with Table III’s; such coherence
is not surprising given the strong overlap between boroughs listed in Table IV and the
Category A boroughs defined above.57
At times, the inhabitants of rural villages and manors (those without a borough)
were also granted the right to collect their own farm. However, we document only about
57Indeed, 41 of the 51 boroughs listed in Category A (Table III) were located on the seacoast and/or
a navigable part of a river. Among these 41 boroughs, 30 royal boroughs (out of 36) and 1 mesne
borough (out of 15) were granted liberties by their lords. The overlap between boroughs listed in Table
IV and the boroughs belonging to Category B and C (Table III) is also strong.
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Table IV: Grants of Liberties and Boroughs’ Geographical Location
Location Nr. Royal Boroughs Nr. Royal Grants Nr. Mesne Boroughs Nr. Mesne Grants
Sea-coast & Navigable River 15 11 (73.33%) 18* 0 (0.00%)
Sea-Coast 12 5 (41.66%) 21* 0 (0.00%)
Navigable River 57 31 (54.38%) 96* 4 (4.16%)
Total 84 47 (55.95%) 134* 4 (2.96%)
Sources: Fine Rolls Henry III (Henry III Fine Rolls Project (2007)), Calendar of the Charter Rolls Henry III - Edward
I (Great Britain Public Record Office, and H. C. Maxwell Lyte, and Stamp, Alfred E. (1908)), Calendar of Patent
Rolls 1216-1307 (Boynton (2003)), Ballard (1913), Ballard and Tait (1923), Tait (1936), Victoria County History (N.d.),
British History Online (2015), Edwards and Hindle (1991), Masschaele (1997).
Notes: (*) Some boroughs changed ownership within the period. We count them as both royal and mesne.
13 such grants – all made under Henry III – despite the fact that rural settlements should
have been as numerous as urban ones, if not more.58
Prediction 3. Boroughs paid their lord in exchange for liberties. Payments took two
forms: (i) a one-time lump-sum payment (fine) and (ii) an increment on their farm. We
document 32 instances in which royal boroughs paid a fine and/or an increment (out
of 62 royal grants), and one such instance among mesne boroughs (out of 15 mesne
grants).59 Table V shows the breakdown between fines and increments. We find no
evidence of a decrease in the farm at the date of the first grant.
More than one third of royal boroughs paid an upfront fine to be granted liber-
ties. The boroughs explicitly paid the fine to obtain the Charter of Liberties, and such
payment constituted a gain to the king. Also, one fifth of royal boroughs paid an in-
crement. Increments over the farm could have reflected other factors, such as improved
local economic conditions. However, the Charter of Andover (1205) makes it clear that
increments could also be related to the obtention of political liberties:
Know ye that we have granted [...] to our burgesses of Andover our manor of
Andover with all its appurtenances at fee farm, to hold to them and their heirs
58Recall that, by and large, each manor comprised an urban and a rural settlement.
59The increments were typically specified in the Charters of Liberties. Concerning royal grants, the
fines were recorded in the Pipe Rolls, the Fine Rolls, and the Book of Fines. Missing data, especially
regarding fines, are a bigger concern for mesne boroughs.
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Table V: Fines and Increments
Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs
Number of Fines 23 0
Number of Increments 14 1
Number of Fines and/or Increments 32 1
Sources: Fine Rolls Henry III (Henry III Fine Rolls Project (2007)), Calendar of the Charter Rolls
Henry III - Edward I (Great Britain Public Record Office, and H. C. Maxwell Lyte, and Stamp,
Alfred E. (1908)), Calendar of Patent Rolls 1216-1307 (Boynton (2003)), Ballard (1913), Ballard
and Tait (1923), Tait (1936), Victoria County History (N.d.), British History Online (2015).
of us and our heirs by the ancient farm, to wit, at £80 a year, and as increment
£15 which they formerly gave us for having the said manor at farm during our
pleasure, and in addition £10 which they afterwards added for having the said
manor at fee farm, and this farm, to wit, £105 in the whole, they shall pay at
our Exchequer yearly to us by their own hands [...].
Much like the fine, the increment seems to have constituted a gain to the king.
Specifically, the grant to burgesses of the right to collect their own farm implied for
the king (i) a revenue equal to the farm and the increment and (ii) a loss equal to
the sum the previous farmer – for example, the sheriff – would have paid for the right
to farm the borough. All cases for which such detailed information survives suggest
a gain to the king.60 For instance, in Lincoln, burgesses paid £180 to the king, and
the sheriff’s farm of the entire shire was reduced by £140, implying a gain of £40 to
the king. We have no information about the sums royal officials extracted prior to a
grant. Regardless, if burgesses were willing to pay for these liberties, they must have
been better off, because of a lower cost of the local administration.
Wars and Rebellions. Undoubtedly, rebellions or their threat played a role in the
granting of liberties. However, fully reconciling rebellions against the king – as opposed
to rebellions against local officials – with the evidence we presented seems difficult.
60See, for instance, Ballard (1913) (pp. lxxvi-lxxvii).
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First, the king extracted more money from a borough when granting it liberties (Pre-
diction 3). Second, as discussed earlier, revoking liberties was not uncommon for the
king. Finally, most of the recorded complaints and uprisings were directed at the local
administration, rather than directly at the king.
The need to wage war was also an important determinant because it may have
induced the king to accept a loss of control in exchange for money. Our theory highlights
a second channel through which wars may have fostered political liberties: the king’s
absence from the realm can only have worsened the issue of controlling local officials
(see Section 2). Coherent with the view that wars matter, Richard I and John made
a significant number of grants in the years immediately preceding the Third Crusade
and the war in France, respectively.
To us, whether in times of war or through rebellions, the fact that burgesses would
negotiate the right to handle the local administration themselves strongly suggests
misbehavior by royal officials was first order in explaining the spread of liberties.
7 Concluding Remarks
We propose a theory that links the rise in trade activity to the evolution of political
liberties. In our model, high gains from trade generate a high demand for law and
order at the local level. To meet this demand, a ruler invests in a relatively large local
administration that is capable of coercion and, therefore, capable of expropriating the
surplus created by trade. Because citizens are better informed than the ruler about
local officials’ behavior, granting them the right to appoint and fire local officials leads
to an efficient supply of law and order. In our framework, both the high demand for
law and order generated by trade and the citizens’ informational advantage about local
officials’ behavior are necessary conditions for the emergence of local political liberties.
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A transition from a rural economy to one increasingly reliant on trade characterized
Post-Norman Conquest England. Boroughs more than doubled, thousands of markets
were created, and numerous international fairs were established. The king, or other
territorial lords, appointed borough officials to provide justice, enforce contracts, reg-
ulate markets, and collect taxes. Often, officials (e.g., sheriffs) bid for their position
(tax farming). As the evidence presented indicates, officials engaged in widespread
misbehavior, leading the king to launch numerous investigations and introduce many
administrative reforms. The king and, to a much lesser extent, local lords eventually
granted the control of the local administration to their commercially most important
boroughs. Often, royal boroughs also obtained that royal officials be banned from
entering the town walls.
As the gradual and concomitant spread of markets and local political liberties sug-
gests, the relation between trade opportunities and liberties is circular. Potential gains
from trade are an important determinant of the grant to boroughs of the right to ap-
point and fire officials in charge of their administration. These liberties, in turn, allow
for more of these gains from trade to be realized.
The period we consider marks the beginning of England’s transition away from feu-
dalism. Arguably, the grant of the right to elect local officials was an early and essential
step toward the subsequent institutional evolution of England. By the end of the thir-
teenth century, boroughs and their merchant elite were represented in parliament, and
negotiated taxation at the national level.
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Appendix 1
Implications of A1-A2: in the trade economy ∃ q̂(u
M
) : y(q) ≤ f(q) + u
M
for q ≥
q̂(u
M
), where q̂(u
M
) is non-increasing in u
M
. q̂(u
M
) is similarly determined in the
manorial economy. Also, in the trade economy: df(q
∗)
dq
> c.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider I = R. The efficient investment q∗(c) is given by
the first-order condition (FOC) dy(q
∗)
dq
= c. Let:
qmax = arg max
{q∈R+}
y(q)− f(q),
that is, qmax is the investment that maximizes M ’s utility when T (t, q, R) = f(q). Given
A1, a unique qmax exists. In the manorial economy, we have q∗ = qmax = 0.
Consider first the manorial economy. R solves:
max
{q∈R+}
f(q)− cq,
s.t. y − f(q) ≥ u
M
.
Let qs(c) denote the solution to this problem, where qs(c) ≥ q∗ = 0. In the trade
economy. R solves a similar problem, where y(q) replaces y in the constraint. From
A1-A2, the solution qs(c) is such that the constraint binds, where qs(c) = q̂ < q∗(c).
To summarize, we have qs(c) ≥ q∗ = 0 in the manorial economy, and qs(c) ≤ q∗(c) in
the trade economy.
Finally, consider the choice of I ∈ {R,M}. Because I = M implies T = 0 in stage
4, Is = R independently of the type of economy considered. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a pair (tE, qE) and suppose first tE > f(qE), which
implies qE < q˜(tE). Hence, the marginal cost of investing in q is equal to c. We need
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to analyze the case in which min[y(qE), f(qE)] = f(qE) only. We have:
[f(qE)− cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs] < [tE − cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs].
Moreover, from ICI(R), we also have:
[tE − cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs] ≤ [t
E − cqE ]
1− βR
.
By combining the last two inequalities, we obtain:
[f(qE)− cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs] < [t
E − cqE ]
1− βR
,
that is, we recover ICT(R).
Suppose now tE ≤ f(qE). Consider the case in which min[y(qE), f(qE)] = f(qE).
When ICT(R) holds, we have:
[tE − CR(tE , qE , R)]
1− βR
≥ [f(qE)− cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs] ≥ [tE − cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs],
where:
[tE − cqE ] + βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs] ≥ [tE − CR(tE , qE , R)] +
βR
1− βR
[f(qs)− cqs].
These two chains of inequalities give:
tE − CR(tE , qE , R) ≥ f(qs)− cqs;
that is, we recover ICI(R). When min[y(qE), f(qE)] = y(qE) and/or when we consider
the manorial economy, the same reasoning holds.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, disregard PC. We denote the solution to (7) as (tr, qr).
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The associated FOC is:
(1− βM )
df(qr)
dq
= c, (8)
Let qˇ(c) be the solution to R’s one-period problem when PC is disregarded:
qˇ(c) = arg max
{q∈R+}
f(q)− cq. (9)
From (8) and (9), we have qr ∈ [0, qˇ(c)] and tr = β
M
[y − U s] + (1− β
M
)f(qr).
Let (tR, qR) be the solution to R’s constrained problem. First, consider (tr, qr). This
pair verifies ICI(R): because R can choose q = qs, if qr 6= qs, it must be that R obtains
a higher payoff. Because tr ≥ f(qr), ICT(R) also holds by Lemma 1. We now turn to
PC. We can have: (i) qˇ(c) ≤ q̂ or (ii) qˇ(c) > q̂. In case (i), qs(c) = qˇ(c), and PC is
rewritten as:
(1− βM )[y − f(qr)] ≥ uM − βMU s.
Because qr(c, β
M
) ∈ [0, qˇ(c)] and because the RHS in the previous inequality is weakly
lower than (1−β
M
)u
M
, we can easily check that PC holds and, therefore, qR = qr(c, β
M
).
In case (ii), qs = q̂, and PC is rewritten as:
(1− βM )[y − f(q)] ≥ (1− βM )uM ,
which implies PC holds if and only if q ≤ q̂. Two subcases can arise: (ii.1) qr(c, β
M
) ≤
q̂, which gives qR = qr(c, β
M
), and (ii.2) qr(c, β
M
) > q̂, which gives qR = q̂ to satisfy
PC. This establishes that qR(c, β
M
) ∈ [0, qs(c)].
Finally, we have:
∂qr
∂βM
=
df(qr)
dq
SOD
< 0,
where SOD is the derivative of the left-hand side of the equality (8) with respect to
q, which is negative because the second-order-condition holds. The higher β
M
is, the
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closer qR(beta
M
, ·) is to q∗. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let q◦(c, c) be the solution when ICT(R) is disregarded. From
PC, t = y(q) − u
M
, which implies q˜(t) = qs = q̂. From (3), C
R
(t, q, R) has a kink
at q = q̂ < q∗(c), and q◦(c, c) < q∗(c). We have two cases: (i) q◦(c, c) > q̂ and (ii)
q◦(c, c) = q̂.
Consider case (i). Let q be defined as y(q) = f(q), where q = q̂(0). Two subcases
can occur: (i.1) q > q◦(c, c) and (i.2) q ≤ q◦(c, c).
In case (i.1), for q ∈ [q̂, q◦], min[y(q), f(q)] = f(q). Hence, when q = q◦, from (3)
and (6), we can define:
β
R
=
u
M
− [y(q◦)− f(q◦)] + [c− c](q◦ − qs)
[f(q◦)− cq◦]− [f(qs)− cqs] . (10)
If β
R
≥ β
R
, PC binds and qR = q◦(c, c) verifies ICT(R). Therefore, tR = [y(q◦)− u
M
].
When β
R
< β
R
, ICT(R) binds. We write ICT(R) as:
y(q)− u
M
− cqs − c(q − qs) ≥ (1− βR)[f(q)− cq] + βR [f(qs)− cqs]. (11)
Recall that, for q ≥ qmax, y(q)
dq
< f(q)
dq
, where qmax is defined in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 and where qmax ≤ q̂ (from A1-A2). Also, the solution to R’s problem is not
greater than q◦(c, c) and not lower than q̂ (because all the constraints trivially hold at q̂).
Hence, as q ∈ [q̂, q◦(c, c)] decreases, the difference between the LHS and the RHS in (11)
increases until verifying ICT(R). When ICT(R) binds, qR(c, c, u
M
, β
R
) ∈ [q̂, q◦(c, c)],
which is non-decreasing in β
R
(from (11)).
In case (i.2), the same procedure applies. However, when ICT(R) is violated, q
has to be sufficiently low so that min[y(q), f(q)] = f(q).
We now verify whether the other disregarded constraints hold. Because PC binds,
IC(M) is given by y(qR) − f(qR) ≤ u
M
, which holds for qR ≥ q̂. Because qR ∈
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[q̂, q◦(c, c)], IC(M) holds. Also, for qR ∈ [q̂, q◦(c, c)], tR = y(qR) − u
M
≤ f(qR).
Therefore, by Lemma 1, ICI(R) also holds.
Finally, in case (ii), the solution is trivially given by qR = q̂. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the following strategy played by R. Cooperation
phase: play Iτ = M , ∀τ . Punishment phase: play the equilibrium of the finitely
repeated stage game. R starts with the cooperation phase in period τ , and switches
forever after to the punishment phase whenever tτ < t
E, for tE to be defined.
Given (tR, qR) as defined in Lemma 2, in the manorial economy R weakly prefers
granting decision rights if tM ≥ V
R
(c) = tR − cqR ≡ tE. When Iτ = M , given
qM = q∗ = 0, IC(M) is:
y − V
R
(c)
1− βM
≥ y + βM
1− βM
U s. (12)
We now show IC(M) does not hold. By substituting tR = β
M
{[y− f(qR)]−U s]}+
f(qR) in (12), we obtain (1− β
M
)f(qR)− cqR ≤ 0, a contradiction to the definition of
qR. To summarize, in the manorial economy, IE = R, and the equilibrium pair (tE, qE)
is given by (tR, qR) as defined in Lemma 2.
In the trade economy, given (tR, qR) from Lemma 3, IE = M if tM ≥ V
R
(c, β
R
) ≡
tR − C(qR). When M pays tM as promised, he solves:
max
{t,q}
y(q)− cq − t, s.t. t ≥ V R(c, βR). (13)
From (13), it is easily seen that M optimally invests qM = q∗(c).
Therefore, IE = M if IC(M) holds:
y(q∗)− cq∗ − V R(c, βR) ≥ (1− βM )[y(q∗)− cq∗] + βMuM ,
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where M also sets q∗(c) when he deviates IC(M) is written as:
βM [y(q
∗)− cq∗ − u
M
] ≥ V R(c, βR). (14)
From (14), the grant of decision rights is a SPE only if M is sufficiently longsighted.
Also, all else equal, the more shortsighted R is and the higher c is, the lower V
R
(c, β
R
)
is, and, therefore, the more likely a grant of decision rights is to occur. 
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Appendix 2
Table VI: Main Events: England, 1066-1307
1066 Norman Conquest - William the Conqueror
1086 - 87 Domesday Survey - William II
1100 Henry I
1105-08 Invasione of Normandy - Campaign in South Wales
1110 ca. Institution of Exchequer, Local Justices, and Itinerant Justices
1111-21 Campaign in Anjou - Campaign in Mid-Wales - War in France - Expedition to North Wales
1123 Expedition to Normandy
1128 Expedition to France
1135 Campaign in Normandy to stop a rebellion
1135 - 54 Stephen of Blois and Civil War
1154 Henry II
1156 - 65 Expedition to Aquitaine - Campaign in Wales - Expedition to Toulouse - Expeditions to Wales
1166 - 69 Assize of Clarendon - Itinerant Justices and Eyre - Campaign in France
1170 - 76 Inquest of the Sheriffs - Prince Henry’s Revolt - Assize of Northampton - Justiciars and Circuits
1177 - 79 Expedition to Normandy - Inquiry into the proceedings of Itinerant Justices - Council at Windsor - Justiciars on Circuits
1180 - 89 Several Expeditions to France to confront Richard
1189 - 94 Richard I - Third Crusade
1192 - 94 End of the Crusade - Return to England - Iter of 1194 - Institution of County Coroners
1194 - 99 War in France - Institution of Justices of the Peace
1198 Inquiry into the assessment and collection of the Carucage
1199 - 1200 John - Expedition to Normandy - Institution of the Borough Coroners
1202 - 04 War with France - Introduction of Custodian Sheriffs
1206 Stay in Poitou and Gascony
1209 - 11 Campaigns in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales
1213 - 15 Local inquiries - Expedition to Poitou
1215 - 17 First Barons’ War - Magna Carta
1216 Henry III (minor)
1220 Ordinance of 1220
1223 Expedition to Wales - Inquiry and reintroduction of Custodian Sheriffs
1225 Expedition to defend Gascony
1227 Henry III assumes the throne
1230 - 31 Expedition to France
1232 - 36 Inquiries - Clarification of Magna Carta - Reintroduction of Custodian Sheriffs
1241 - 43 Expedition to Wales - Expedition to Poitou
1245 Expedition to Wales
1253 - 54 Expedition to Gascony
1254 - 55 Inquiries (Eyres)
1257 Expedition to Wales
1258 - 59 Provisions of Oxford and Westminster - Ordinance of Sheriffs - Petition of the Barons - Ordinances of the Magnates
1259 - 60 Inquiries (Eyres) - Henry’s stay in Normandy
1262 Henry’s stay in France
1263 - 67 Second Barons’ War - Statute of Marlborough
1272 Edward I is on Crusade
1274 - 76 Edward returns to England - Hundred Rolls Inquiries - Parliament - Statutes of Exchequer and Westminster I - Statute of Ragman
1277 First Welsh War - Introduction of Keepers of the Peace
1278 - 79 Inquiries (Eyres) and Survey - Statute of Gloucester
1282 - 84 Expedition to Wales
1283 - 86 Statutes of Acton Burnell - Rhuddlan - Merchants - Westminster II - City of London - Exeter
1284-85 Inquiries (Exchequer Inquest - Kirby’s Quest)
1286 - 89 Edward’s stay in Gascony
1290 - 93 Inquiries (State Trials) - Introduction of the Justices of the Assises - Statute of Persons to be put in Assises and Juries
1294 - 98 War with France - First War of Scottish Independence
1298 - 1300 Inquiry into grievancies - Statute of Fines Levied - Articuli super Cartas
1299 - 1300 Statute of Fines Levied - Articuli super Cartas
1303 Second conquest of Scotland
1304 - 05 Trailbaston Inquiry
1307 Expedition to Scotland
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